

PERSUADING RATHER THAN CONVINCING: ADDITIONAL NOTES ON THE RELATIONS AMONG WITTGENSTEIN AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

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Abstract: The relations that Wittgenstein entertains with Freud's thinking, as indicated by some scholars, are markedly ambiguous: there is, for one side, an acerbic criticism about the pseudoscientific character by which psychoanalysis presents its supposed "empirical discoveries", and, consequently, the fascination exerted by this kind of procedure. But there is also, for the other side, evidences of admiration by the dissolving effect that the use of interpretations and metaphors in psychoanalysis accomplishes, encouraging Wittgenstein to incorporate such strategy to his own method of logical investigation of philosophical concepts. In this article I intend to draw some reflections about the method incorporated by the *Philosophical Investigations*, in several aspects really similar to a clinic of a desubstantialized linguistic psychoanalysis, in order to add some positive points to the criticism usually made to the Lacanian conception of language.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, conceptual therapy, theory of language, psychoanalysis, Lacan.

Resumo: As relações que Wittgenstein mantém com o pensamento de Freud, como atestaram vários estudiosos, são marcadamente ambíguas: existe, por um lado, uma crítica acerba do caráter pseudocientífico com que a psicanálise apresenta supostas "descobertas empíricas", e do fascínio exercido por este modo de proceder; mas há, por outro lado, evidências da sua admiração pelo efeito dissolvente do uso de metáforas e interpretações, chegando mesmo Wittgenstein a incorporar essa estratégia ao seu próprio método de investigação lógica dos conceitos filosóficos. Neste trabalho pretendo retirar de uma reflexão acerca do método incorporado às *Investigações Filosóficas*, comparável em muitos aspectos à clínica de uma psicanálise lingüística dessubstancializada, alguns pontos positivos que se poderiam acrescentar à crítica da concepção de linguagem de Lacan.

Palavras-chave: Wittgenstein, terapia conceitual, teoria da linguagem, psicanálise, Lacan.

1.

During the Lent Term in 1938, Wittgenstein wrote down an observation in English in his notebook (MS-158, p. 34r): "I'm not teaching you anything; I'm trying to persuade you to do something. What we do is much akin to psychonalysis than you might be aware of" (*in*: Wittgenstein, 2000. Underlined in the original). Reflection follows until it circumscribes the idea that the chosen philosophical method is to operate on the will, not on the intellect.

1.0.1.

This philosophical attitude, which characterizes Wittgenstein's thinking after his return to Cambridge – "The philosopher strives to find the liberating word, that is, the word that finally permits us to grasp what up until now has intangibly weighed down our consciousness" (TS 213, s. 409, *in*: Wittgenstein, 1993b, p. 164) –, is refined through the investigation of the mathematical, linguistic and psychological concepts, and reaches its apex in the sophisticated text presented in the first part of the *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein, 1958). An orientation which goes until the final notes, when the philosopher considers about the value of persuasion over reasoning:

"When two principles which come across cannot reconcile with each other, so one qualifies the other as fool and heretic."

"I said that I would 'fight' the other, - but couldn't I give him *reasons*? Sure; but until where would they reach? In the end of reasons is *persuasion*. (Think what happens when missionaries convert the natives)" (Wittgenstein, 1969b, §§ 611-612).

1.0.2.

Conceptual therapy consists in correlating certain hindrances, certain metaphysical shadows, certain images which lay down on our ordinary language, to a *übersichtliche Darstellung*, to a “perspicuous presentation” of what we do when we use language. This correlation is carried out through analogies and possible linkages into the patient’s grammar with the purpose of achieving a conversion that makes her see differently the same things and, consequently, releases her from philosophical problems.

“A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in ‘seeing connexions’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate cases*.” (Wittgenstein, 1958, § 122).

1.0.2.1.

If I say that this table before us is not solid because the wood with which it is made of consists of so rarefied electrons that we can almost say that the occupied space is empty, so there is a bad use of the word “solidity” (cf. Wittgenstein, 1969a, pp. 45-46). The bizarre effect happens because a scientific image, coming from the concept of “electron”, was mixed with the grammar of the concept of “solidity”. It is on the imprisoning image that will be extended comparisons, analogies and therapeutic linkages.

1.1

It might seem weird such likening between the philosophical attitude of the Wittgensteinian investigations and the strategy of psychoanalysis, for it is largely known that our author became extremely furious with just the suggestion, published in an article for the popularization of the British contemporary philosophy in 1946, that “in his conception, philosophy was a form of psychoanalysis” (Malcolm, 1977, p. 56). Malcolm heard Wittgenstein at least twice attacking explicitly this kind of linkage, saying that it was based in confusion. His form of philosophy and psychoanalysis were, to his mind, “different techniques” (*idem*, p. 57).

1.2.

Notwithstanding, to add some fuel to the fire of the *appearances of ambiguity* so characteristic of the Wittgensteinian method, Bouwsma reports that when Wittgenstein submitted a monography to a Cambridge comission to his admission as professor, 72 of the 140 text pages, more than a half, were devoted to the idea that philosophy were similar to psychoanalysis. A month later, Keynes met him and said that he was impressed by the idea that “philosophy is psychoanaysis. And so it goes.” (Bouwsma, 1986, p. 36).

1.3.

Just for this reason it seems to be very appropriate McGuinness comment (1998, pp. 27-28) about a quotation from the *Vermischte Bemerkungen* (1998, p.42) where Wittgenstein declares that the real originality of psychoanalysis comes from Breuer, not from Freud. Wittgenstein, in fact, was worriedly comparing himself to Freud. He thought that his kind of originality was more fertile than genuine: his thought consisted in reproducing other’s thoughts in a more refined way, and, by this reason, he was, just like Freud, comparable to a fertile soil in which a seed could grow with more proficiency. But not Breuer, he was the real germ of psychoanalysis.

1.3.0.1.

McGuinness interprets that Breuer interested Wittgenstein because he could resign the consecution of merely hypothetical ideas to the ground, really doubtful in this case, of the real scientific discoveries. Joined with another quotation from the *Vermischte Bemerkungen* –

“Being psychoanalyzed is in a way like eating from the tree of knowledge. The knowledge we acquire sets us (new) ethical problems; but contributes nothing to their solution.” (*idem*, p. 40)

– we can conclude that, for Wittgenstein, the dangers implied by this new form of art, which conquers adherents by means of the power of its metaphors, and by resolving inscrutable enigmas as if it were variables processed in an equation, are actually greater than its profits:

“Freud’s fanciful pseudo-explanations (just because they are so brilliant [*geistreich*]) performed a disservice. (Now every ass has them with the reach for ‘explaining’ symptoms of illness with their help.)” (*ib.*, pp. 62-63)

1.4.

It is also in this spirit that Bouveresse (1991, pp. 13-53) places an emphatic question mark when he uses the expression “disciple” or “follower” relating Wittgenstein to Freud, in regard to the conversations between the philosopher and Rhees (Wittgenstein, 1966, p. 41). Wittgenstein was a doubtful Freud’s disciple, or, at least, pretty atypical. Rhees (*id.*, *ib.*) points out that Wittgenstein esteemed Freud for the acute observations and suggestion of his texts; for having always something good to say even when he seemed completely wrong. The philosopher said that to learn something from Freud one must be critical; but psychoanalysis had the general tendency to annul such qualities.

1.5.

As a matter of fact, the name of Freud is out of sight in the list of authors which decisively influenced Wittgenstein’s thought (cf. Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 16). But, just like the reproductive Freud, adds Wittgenstein: “What I invent are new *comparisons*.” (*id.*, *ib.*)

2.

Nonetheless, I do not want to be confined to the similarities, differences and conflicts between Wittgenstein and Freud. After the publishing of Cioffi’s (1998), McGuinness’ (1998), Bouveresse’s (1991), and mainly Baker’s (1997) texts, just to mention four of the most known and brilliant papers, and after the criticism is reasonably settled, it seems pretty sensible to follow Wittgenstein’s suggestion and go to “learn something from Freud” (cf. Wittgenstein, 1966, p. 41).

2.1.

With the expression “to learn something from Freud” I want to indicate a little bit more daring interpretation than to restrict myself to reflect about what would our author have possibly assimilated from the psychoanalytic mythology to configure his therapeutic interventions into the traditional mathematical, psychological and linguistic concepts. While trying this high jump, much more risky to failure, I hope to weave some speculations about his “method” of logical investigation of thinking, as it appears published in the text of *Philosophical Investigations*. This text is the result of more than sixteen years of obsessive revisions which finally transformed an intended book into a consigned album (cf. Pichler, 2004). What I want to suggest is that, apparently, the conceptual autotherapy strongly coincides – *avant-la-lettre* – with a clinic of a linguistic psychoanalysis like Lacan’s, for example.

2.1.1.

A “clinic of a linguistic psychoanalysis” means here the practical part of the psychoanalytic proposal without its spare theoretical part. For, as highlights Bouveresse (1991, pp. 52-53), it has no good in trying to solve Freud’s concessions to the ordinary materialism, to the biologism, and to the energetics, replacing them by the primacy of the signifier over the signified. Wittgenstein kept all his life interested in the forms of language, but, obviously, after his return to Cambridge in 1929, conceived them in a plural way, no more as a sort of sublimation (cf. Wittgenstein, 1958, §§ 89, 94).

2.1.1.1.

To rely solely in what the late Wittgenstein had understood as “logic”, or as “form”, is that I answer in a different way the question made by Bouveresse about which one of two – Lacan or Wittgenstein – kept himself closer of the Freudian work spirit (1991, p. 53). Bouveresse thinks that the Austrian philosopher could be called an anti-Lacan *avant la lettre*; in this article I defend that this criticism fits in general Lacanian structural linguistics and topology, but not in his eminently anti-psychological clinics and the theoretical part with which it is closed connected.

2.1.1.2.

Of a psychoanalytic clinics destituted of its dogmatic parts it must remain just the necessary foundation to effect the rules of the game.

3.

A high jump consists in leaving the texts ground and raising up into different levels, but without loosing the support. Louis Sass (2001), in my view, loosed his support. Given the fact that Wittgenstein commentaries on Freud are scattered and unsystematic, this author intended to speculate how it would be a “Wittgensteinian style of psychoanalysis” (p. 255) resorting to Waismann reflections on “will and motive”. The result, it could not be any other, was a criticism of Davidson’s, Rorty’s, and Marcia Cavell’s pragmatic-causalism which fell back into phenomenology (cf. *idem*, p. 275).

3.1.

Sass interprets that in his uncompleted essay from the 40’s, “Will and Motive”, Waismann (2000) did not restrain himself, as did Wittgenstein, just to the conceptual analysis, or to the linguistic forms, or to the grammar of psychological concepts, but joined the grammatical description with a “more empirical, or phenomenological, approach which aspires to elucidate the psychological phenomena themselves” (Sass, 2001, p. 275). It is really to be in disagreement because the author clearly notes that “the concept of motive has no real existence, but it is not also unreal” (cf. Waismann, *op. cit.*, p. 295), clearly asserts that “to describe the psychical it is necessary to have a *language* which is also unstable...” (*id.*, *ib.*, italics in the original), clearly varies the examples in which the word “motive” seems to be well applied as well as in which it seems to be just a “mythology” (*ib.*, p. 284). If it is so, one cannot to draw the conclusion that he is really doing phenomenology, hermeneutics or empirical analysis.

3.1.1.

Whatsoever, one must stress that Sass confusion seems to be contained in the image that Wittgensteinian investigation of psychological concepts, in not being psychological, could be, by this reason, interpreted as “abstract”. Saying that “just in the flow of life words have their meanings” (Wittgenstein, 1990, § 913; cf. *ib.* 1981, § 173; MS 169, p. 47v, *in*: 2000; e Malcolm,

1977, p. 93) means asserting that the language games, the grammatical rules, dissolve themselves in the multifaceted forms of life and are from them, as a matter of fact, inseparable. The practical spirit of Wittgenstein's logical-philosophical investigations remains even when we examine, for example, the "autonomy of grammar" or its "transcendental aspect" (cf. Moreno, 2005, pp. 78-84): nothing that is necessary becomes, for this sole reason, universal and fixed. This being said, we can describe without fearing to deviate to the stratospheric, but also without dissipating into the empiric, the experience organized into a concept, i.e., the several *forms of presentation* of language in time and space, because its concreteness prevents us against the eventual risk to point to a "phantasm" (Wittgenstein, 1958, § 108).

3.2.

What really interests, diverging of Bouveresse, is to say that the spirit of the Freudian work coincides with the Lacanian clinics and with the Wittgensteinian method as well: both are pragmatic slopes which deal with linguistic forms constituted *a priori* and whose sole objective is not the proposition of new theories to which the patient must agree, the result of convincing, but the cure.

3.2.1.

So, the scattered reflections of Wittgenstein on Freud and psychoanalysis are not useful in order to draw conclusions about psychoanalysis. But they would fit to cure the philosophical illness of psychoanalysis and to reveal its unconscious false necessities:

"It is a prime philosophical activity to warn against false comparisons. To warn against false metaphors that our manner of expressing – without being totally conscious of them – take as foundations.

I believe that our method here is similar to psychoanalysis, which wants to make conscious the unconscious and, by this way, neutralize it, and I believe that this similarity is not purely superficial" (MS 109, p. 174; in: Wittgenstein, 2000)

3.2.2.

Lacanian clinics, in the same way, acts to dissolve the psychic suffering: what it does is nothing more than to take very seriously a grammar, that is, the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis dissolved in time: "Transference is a relation essentially connected to time and its handling" (1966a, p. 844). Lacan desubstantialize Freudian unconscious in temporality through a determined *form of action*: solely the strategic position of the analyst before the patient talking is capable to impress a direction to cure.

3.3.

If we also temporalize the linguistic concepts and the topology of all different phases of Lacanian theory, we would find in the psychoanalytic clinics the form of language in the flow of life, i.e., inseparable from the analytical setting, preventing either the theoretical or the linguistic abstractions because it would be always related to the patient's cure. By this way we could bring back the words from the metaphysical to its ordinary use (cf. Wittgenstein, 1958, § 116).

3.3.1.

We have in Wittgenstein a philosophy of psychoanalysis as a therapy of psychoanalysis: "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness" (*idem*, § 255).

4.


Let us take, for example, the structural conceptions of masculinity and femininity proposed by Lacan in 1973 (1975, pp. 99-113). Just in the beginning of the referred session of this seminar, Lacan emphasizes that these concepts mean “positions in knowledge (*savoir*)”, it means, places someone can occupy in talking, understood as a social linkage of a certain kind. I.e., masculinity and femininity represent, as possible self-identifications, someone who has a symbolic (or imaginary) answer, a “certainty”, say, a certainty which is not self-supported but on the “other”, in the same very way as he had taught on the “four discourses” doctrine in another occasion (cf. Lacan, 1991).

4.1.

His conceptions of masculinity and femininity, or, more textually based, “man” and “woman”, are supposed to be important to be used in clinics as a more sophisticated structuralist version capable to embrace in just one single theoretical movement the central psychoanalytic concepts of Oedipus complex, the unconscious and the sexuality as a “compressed” (*refoulement*), which, opposed to the empirical handling given to them by Freud, are treated here just as empty content forms which resembles pretty much the concept of “gender” in anthropology.

4.2.

As Lacan does not work with these conceptions in a discursive manner, he strives to constitute logical formalities whose pretension is to subsume in a few “letters” (Lacan is always punning with mistakingly homophonies of the word “*lettre*”, as it is also for him a synonym term of “signifier”), a whole theoretical teaching of psychoanalysis. Here, then, the logical forms of the self-identifications of the “talking being” as “man” and as “woman”.



4.2.1.

It is a complex table with four cells split among two columns and two rows. On the above row, we have four quantificational formulae, two to the left more two to the right side. Lacan asserts that “Whoever is a talking being, is inscribed into one or the other side.” (1975, p. 100).

4.2.2.

So, let us take all human beings (the talking beings) who inscribed themselves, as says Lacan, as a whole, as the “man”. The formulae which are in the left side of the above row indicate that there is an x for whom the function Φ , universally applied, is negated. It is a Hegelian reasoning for which the concept, taken as an universal abstraction, is affirmed in contradiction with a particularity. The particularity, by its turn, contradicts the concept because, while the last is affirmed by the common notes of all particularities, the former reserve for itself idiosyncrasies

which affirm them, contradictorily, as differences of identities. Lacan designates this old and known maxim of the Hegelian logic with the wit “the universal is founded by the exception”.

4.2.2.1.

We should observe that in this logic the differentiation is not only numeric but also qualitative, which, for the same reason, differentiates itself from the formal classical logic.

4.2.3.

The quality door opens for Lacan, for that reason, the opportunity to aggregate to the formula the reasoning, which belongs to the tradition of psychoanalysis, that if we all are castrated, this only happens by contradiction to the fact that there is at least one particular being who is not. This is what this author calls “father function”, which also suggests the “inexistence”, for everyone, of the “jouissance”.

4.2.3.1.

There is no confusion in a logic which, from the beginning, is extensively defined as comprehension of quantity and quality.

4.2.3.2.

But there is an increase, a pasting, a connexion or a Humean association, whatever you like, between a way of thinking and a logical formula.

4.2.3.3.

A sentence of the kind – “The human body is modeled and splitted by the tripartition of the registers of the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary” (André, 1987, p. 103) – would be tremendously confused if understood not as a metaphor but as an empirical datum. This affirmation cannot be negated nor relativized without loss of sense. A metaphor should be treated as it is, without turning it into sociology or empirical psychology. (Cf. in Simanke, 2002, a reflection about the metaphorical character of Lacanian theory.)

4.4.

In the right side of the above part of the table, we have “the inscription of the woman part of the talking beings” (*idem*, p. 101). This part, as it can be understood, is not a necessity but an option. A person has the choice of putting her/himself as a Φx or not. If, by chance, a talking being inscribe her/himself as “woman”, she/he will be “not-all”, as proposed by the formula.

4.4.1.

If, then, we have “the man” as a totality founded by the exception, we also have, by the other side, the particularity “a woman” who cannot be complete.

4.4.2.

“Man” and “woman” are not more “sexes” but “forms of jouissance”, so to say. It is not simply that the empirical was recooked here by the transcendental, but, in a more prosaic way, that reality is nothing but “psychic reality” or “fantasy”. In Lacanian terms, the fundamental division of the subject does not allow her/himself access to the sexual relationship but only

through the sublimated alternatives of the “phallic jouissance” (man) or the “Other jouissance” (woman).

4.4.3.

The psychoanalytic tradition has the ability – or the infelicity – of defining femininity by masculinity.

4.5.

In the below side of the table we find the “sexual identifications of the humanity” (cf. *ib.*, p. 101). To the left is “man”, for whom we find two symbols, the $\$$ and the Φ , which for Lacan are signifiers. The former is what he calls a S_1 , a signifier which cannot have a signified, also an exception which founds the slipping totality of the chain of signifiers, and, by this reason, a species of logical guardian of the “failure of sense”. The last is the fundamental signifier of desire, the “Phallus”, which is its identificatory support. There is an arrow which comes from the $\$$ and goes to the other side of the table to join the symbol a . This a is the “Other”’s desire taken by her/his object, that is, the desire of the Other’s desire. In Lacanian terms, “the object cause of desire”. The conjunction of the two symbols is called “fantasy”: it is imprisoned by a fantasy that is the subject “comprehended” as fundamentally splitted by the impossibility of the sexual relationship.

4.6.

At the other side, we have the field which can only be identified by its opposite side, or, in other words, it cannot have an autonomous signifier self-identification. If “the signifier represents the subject to another signifier” (1961, session of 12/06/1961), precisely in this position such representation is absent. With this move, Lacan intends to shelter in his theory an old Freudian tradition valued through the psychoanalytic question without answer – *was will das Weib?* (“What does a woman want?”). One of the symbols $L\cancel{A}$ which points at the “Phallus” and, simultaneously, at the symbol $\bar{S}(A)$ formally represents this absence of answer. The latter is the Other signifier which, by definition, is both “barred”, to be an unconscious founder whose nature is complete opacity, and “emptied”, for do not have the answers to our demands. So, to the talking being which places her/himself by the side of the “not-all” there is no identification but through the difference. Therefore, an identification from out of language, so to say, because it would be, in the sexual relationship, in relation to what that could be said about the unconscious, the radically “Other” (cf., *ib.*, p. 102).

5.

If we accept that the grammar of psychoanalysis essentially consists, as Lacan says, in the transference as a relation connected with time and its handling, what use could have all the above speculations about the compressed (*refoulée*) sexuality, the unconscious, and the Oedipus? In other words, structural-linguistic constructions represented by empty formulae could be of what help to give us conditions of actualization of the traditional psychoanalytic theory related to the particular situations?

5.1.

We could think about the following: our particular, clinical, situations really need to resort to formulae which crystallize in pure form theoretical dimensions which define femininity by masculinity?

5.2.

We could also think about the following: is it necessary such a grade of complexity to empirically deal with a copious and, as a matter of fact, unfathomable variety of situations? Would not this question be better solved in an open way, with the theoretical burden appropriated to a grammar, minimal and applicable, which always essentially and *a priori* define everything we use in our practical life, which actually includes the forms “man” and “woman” in particular situations in which there are necessity of them?

5.3.

We could also think about the following: to preserve Freud’s work also means to preserve, although in a formal manner, Freud’s anachronisms?

5.4.

And, finally, we could think about the following: are there pure linguistic definitions, like the definition of “signifier”, untouchable, immaculate, which can be really fixed as empty content formulae without psychology *par excellence*? Of something which does not reflect the sun rays, does not obey the gravity law and whose presence does not alter absolutely nothing in the physical constitution of the world, why does worth still believe in it?

5.4.1.

This is not a positivist repudiation to metaphysics; it is just an observation about some moments in which language seems to go on holiday (cf. Wittgenstein, 1958, § 38).

5.5

It is supposed that if the woman does not exist but as the other from the discourse founded on her radical exclusion, so, just by this reason, her absence returns with new strenght in order to shatter the foundations of the received order. However, if Lacanian abstraccionism about the feminine is valued just because of this rationale, so remains unperceived that under the veil of negativity nothing from the categorical scheme of identity can be threatened. The supposed revolutionary agent must drink in the same condemned fountain and acts by the same logic which had to be abolished.

5.6.

The fact is that “masculinity” and “femininity”, or “the man” and “a woman”, how the text wants, do not seem to be concepts which can be read through a timeless logical form. Those concepts can really have *a form* entailed to them; they really meet a social expectation in people’s attitudes related to a role to be or not accomplished. But those forms are inseparable from those attitudes; therefore, they are dissolved in forms of life, joined to them, and, for this reason, do not seem capable to be written in sublimated logical formulae, or even less in the form of signifiers correlated or interconnected in an unexplained way, as they could not dissimulate some strangeness if they were converted into predictive laws or into tools for sociological interpretation of empirical phenomena.

5.6.1.

If we take into account that description must search for the dissimilarities (*idem*, § 130), our will gets free from the image which ties it, and it becomes possible to think about the grammar of masculinity and femininity as different language games: “We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike” (*ib.*, parte II, p. 224). Or still:

“While you can have complete certainty about someone else’s state of mind, still it is always merely subjective, not objective, certainty.’ – These two words betoken a difference between language-games” (*ib.*, *ib.*, p. 225).

6.

We have in the *Philosophical Investigations* the most accomplished model of conceptual therapy. It could also deplete a linguistic psychoanalysis.

6.0.1.

To figure out a “Wittgensteinian psychoanalysis” would be nonsense. If philosophy cannot discover anything, if it cannot touch in any way in the effective use of language, if it leaves everything as it is, and just describes (cf. *ib.*, § 124), so the result of a conceptual therapy of psychoanalysis is just psychoanalysis without its conceptual confusions.

6.1.

Just to begin, in spite of what seems to be the case up to this point, Wittgenstein never stated that there is only one method to do philosophy: “There is not *a* philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.” (*ib.*, § 133). It would be like to say there is only one method to cook some delicacy. This is not true. We should be able to prepare a good dish in many different ways. That is because there is a general method, varied through multiple facets, according to each one’s imagination and creativity, to a good performance of a determined task. What Wittgenstein offers us in his philosophical investigations is a general method for a good conceptual therapy (cf. Hilmy, 1989, pp. 3-6).

6.1.1.

A good general method for the psychoanalytic clinics of neurosis, as Lacan recommends, is to turn hysterical the patient’s talking: it is only through the questioning about him/herself that the patient can pour out talking, the end of transference, placing, in the same time, the psychoanalyst either in a position of knowledge, or in a position of object of desire.

6.2.

What is the general method of the thinking therapist? She does logical investigations: “It is actually a progress the acknowledgement of a philosophical problem as something logical. With this comes the correct placement and the method.” (Wittgenstein, 1990, § 256). This means: she investigates the limits of the words sense in the ground of their applicability. But be understood: this is no more that sublimed logic, essentialist and timeless, defended by the young Wittgenstein, as it is presented in the *Tractatus* (Wittgenstein, 1993a). In the *Investigations*, logic came down from its eminent platform and became part of forms of life, being translated by the metaphor of the “language-games” (cf. Wittgenstein, 1958, § 23). There are several language-games, the majority very different from each other; others very similar to each other; and still others sometimes imbricated – the variety is virtually infinite. The report of a dream, for example, is a language-game (*idem*, part II, pp. 222-223); the description of an aroma of coffee (*ib.*, § 610), it is also so; the description of a feeling (*ib.*, part II, pp. 181-183), or of an

“atmosphere” in an unusual situation (*ib.*, § 609), are also the same. These are always experiences organized through concepts, by which we can expect that something happens, lengthen and finishes in a certain way. Several of these games also arise as a novelty unknown before, while a whole amount of them is forgotten and simply disappear. The language-games are joined to activities learned by rules in a culture, corrected by norms of “how to do”, but those rules do not cause the game, they are part of it: this would be like saying that we play tennis because of the rules. But what we really learn is a *form of presentation*, or a *grammatical proposition*, which organizes the experience in a determined way, interrelate the objects and authorizes logical transformations on them (cf. Wittgenstein, 1969b, §§ 167, 321). We not only learn how to calculate in a determined form, we can also extend the game to infinite variations. In all these cases there is a logic to be described and problematized, if it is the case: “And to logic belongs everything a language-game describes” (*idem*, § 56). The description of a rule, notwithstanding, is just an interpretation, that is, another game. In the end, when finishes the description of reasons, there are no more rules, it remains naked the activity (cf. Wittgenstein, 1958, §§ 211, 217).

6.2.0.

The concept of “language-game” does not refer to any theory of language, how it is and what we can do with it. There is nothing in the reality which must forcibly correspond to a language-game. This concept, enough vague by itself, is necessarily and sufficiently precise to the ends to which it is proposed: to serve as an *object of comparison* (*idem*, §§ 130-131).

6.2.1.

In an activity constituted by a grammar does not remain the will as a rest. If my justifications have exhausted, my spade is turned when I reach the bedrock, and I say: “This is what I do” (*ib.*, § 217), we can observe that the will is in the very grammatical form: the will is what we do. We can add: the will is not something which happens, how the empirist wants, nor a transcendental element, as I cannot will willing (cf. *ib.*, §§ 611, 613). What we do naturally implies responsibility.

6.2.1.1.

Wittgenstein’s exigences are architectonic, they refer only to the form: any explanation, if it occurs, is merely ornament which sustains anything (*ib.*, § 217).

6.2.1.2.

The grammatical therapy incur on the will captivated by an image: “A *picture* held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.” (*ib.*, § 115).

6.2.1.3.

The grammatical therapy works with the material given by the patient, since that are her forms of presentation that will be extended into analogies up to the limits of sense, in order to contemplate them in an overview (*ib.*, § 122).

6.2.2.

In the clinic the psychoanalyst also observes the form of the patient’s talking, with what rules she plays her game, in order to hold a position according the interest or the direction of the cure.

It is possible to interpret psychoanalysis as a power game clinically calculated: what the patient do must be gramatically justified. In the exposition of reasons, that is, always the material given by the patient and nothing from out of her talking, is where can be found the “object cause of desire” to be “worked out”.

6.3.

How is the general method of the thinking therapist? She follows the traces of the philosophical problems settled down into our grammar, in the use of our rules, in the point which the words crash against the wall of language and make no sense anymore, in what we could call the “grammatical illusions” (*ib.*, §§ 96, 110). The method is the description of those problems, problems of philosophical nature, of course (*ib.*, §§ 109, 124). Since philosophy has no proposals, nothing to discover, nothing to explain, the philosopher describes a grammar not to determine its correction, its good hits, its conformities: it has no moral aim. Contrary to that, the thinking therapist drive our attention to what seem unfamiliar to us precisely in what is familiar, in order to dissolve those problems e give back the activity in the same way as it can be found in the ordinary world. (*ib.*, § 129): she introduces objects of comparison, like the language-games, not to illuminate similarities, but to see dissimilarities at the aspect of the things (*ib.*, § 130).

6.3.1.

For relying just in the forms, the clinic of psychoanalysis does not care about the talking content, nor about the patient’s morality. The moral hindrance, contrary to this, denounce the symptom to be worked out; and the content of what is talked, to present the agent to which it corresponds. The symptoms dissolution also happens in the form: scansions, puctuations, cuts, or, in strictly necessary cases of direct intervention, proposition of metaphors.

6.4.

How is this description done? In the text of the *Investigations* is established a debate among several voices, constituting something similar to what Siqueira (2004, pp. 22-29) calls, according to Bakhtin’s theory, a *polifonic dialogue* (Soulez also writes about the Bakhtinian dialogue and the musical character of Wittgenstein’s way of philosophical composing, in 2005, pp. 313-325; cf. th. Baker, 2003). By this reason, it would not be very precise to interpret the *Investigations*’ dialogues as a talking between Wittgenstein and his interlocutor, or between “Socrates” and his “disciple”, or between the “voice of correction” *versus* the “voice of temptation” (respectively, Glock, 1997, p. 222; Bouveresse, 1973, p. 21; and Cavell, 1997, p. 42). Such interpretations induce to realize a monologue, more appropriated to the Socratic dialogue which invites the subject to talk in order to subjugate her voice to the protagonist truth. In such case we would loose the vision of an atheoretical and dissolving poliphony, as it seems to be the matter. It is in the middle of those discontinuous dialogues, in which sometimes the voice of an “I” melts with the voice of a next, or with a third or a fourth voice, in which also sometimes the narratives are mixed up and superposed, that the text suggests that we can establish new arrangements and connexions for what is known for a long time, for what was always before us and we could not see. It is there where are raised analogies, comparisons and aphorisms which weaken our craving for generality, where the discussions go to a so unusual path that, if we try to put them into a frame, like someone who is trying to straight the labyrinths of language, we invariably finish in paradoxes, as really happens in several passages of the *Investigations* (cf. Stern, 2005).

6.4.1.

We cannot restrict the psychoanalytic clinics to merely two characters: the psychoanalyst and her patient. The game has its course, as a matter of fact, among four players, to say the least. If

the psychoanalyst sometimes occupy in the patient's talking the position of "knowledge", and sometimes the position of "object of desire", we will have, at least, four players in the "poker table", since the analyst will never be where the patient thinks she is. Even the patient will not be fixed in a single position: she will change according to the "cards distribution". Is it not exactly that situation pictured by the model Lacan called "Scheme L"? (cf. 1966b, pp. 429-430).

6.5.

What is the objective of the conceptual therapy? If the Wittgensteinian philosophical investigations have no moral objective, it is not for this reason that we can say that they do not have an ethical component. Besides the fact that grammar implies first person's responsibility, it is not dissimulated in his therapeutic activity a combative character, a fight attitude ("Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (Wittgenstein, 1958, § 109)) – or even of war. The fight is against dogmatism, but the war is against the "darkness of this time", as suggested by the preface (cf. *idem*, p. 12). A time subjected by the scientificism prevailing in American and European civilizations, which occupies "The spirit of this civilization the expression of which is the industry, architecture, music, of present day fascism & socialism..." (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 8). For this reason, thinks Wittgenstein, although improbable, it was not impossible that his book could bring light into one brain or another (cf. 1958, p. vi).

6.5.1.

The ethics of psychoanalysis is the ethics of desire (cf. Lacan, 1986). The finality of clinics is the responsibility before the "other", to whom, finally, belongs the desire. If we can only speak about desire in the first person, this immediately implies a social bond from which we cannot escape, as well as abstain to interfere. The ethics of desire means an active posture before the linguistic legacy which incessantly appeals and problematizes us at an individual and social levels.

7.

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. (cf. Wittgenstein, 1993a, § 7).

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